China Redux

In my post a few weeks back on “who’s who” in China policy, I identified the Commander of US Pacific Command as one of the most important figures in managing the US-China security relationship. I also noted that there is a new PACOM Commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, and that he replaced Admiral William Fallon, who recently became Commander of CENTCOM (with command over Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan).

Considering that senior military officers often rotate assignments, that Central Command has recently undergone significant leadership changes (including the departure of the previous CENTCOM Commander, Army General John Abizaid), and that Admiral Fallon is generally regarded as one of the military’s most experienced officers, a move such as this normally would not have garned much interest outside professional channels.

And yet I can’t help but think there’s some other dynamic going on under the surface. First, there’s the issue of appointing a Naval officer to lead wars largely being fought on the ground and in the air. Personally, that snipe sounds bogus to me. For years, the military has emphasized “jointness” and “interoperability” in its training, operations, and planning. What better way to send a signal that these ideas are being implemented than by appointing a experienced leader such as Fallon to this post. Then there’s the more cynical take on Fallon’s appointment: that the Bush Administration is preparing for war with Iran, which almost certainly would require significant naval operations.

What is more noteworthy in all this is Fallon’s record as PACOM Commander, where he was an outspoken proponent of increasing US military cooperation with China.  William Arkin, in a must-read post on his Early Warning blog, confirms that “Adm. Fallon indeed directed his planners in Hawaii not to prepare contingency ’strategic’ air strikes against mainland Chinese targets as part of U.S. options in a China-Taiwan contingency.” You can bet that a lot of people in the administration and the military did not like Fallon’s orders. In fact, Arkin reports that Fallon’s planners disobeyed him and went ahead with the contigency preparations anyway.

Fast forward to Fallon’s re-assignment to the prize position of CENTCOM Commander. Being named Commander of CENTCOM while the US is fighting two wars in the region is a major achievement and a vote of confidence from Fallon’s bosses and peers, right? Maybe so. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace would seem to support Fallon’s strategy in the Pacific, as I wrote about earlier. But the person who ultimately controls the administration’s foreign policy clearly does not. Remember that Fallon’s appointment is a political one. Might the Administration have given Fallon the prestigious CENTCOM Command just to get him out of the way in Asia? Certainly seems plausible.

Here’s Arkin on Fallon again:

Fallon then is either the very feckless figurehead that military insiders decry appointed to CENTCOM so that Darth Cheney can run the world; or he is a wise man brought in to ratchet down the tensions.

The other and more likely possibility is that Fallon is merely the symbol of institutional military impotence and failings in the face of ideology. High-ranking officers can have fabulous military intuitions and judgments; they can be intellectual giants. Still, if the ideologues want to do something, or if the secret warriors go off in their own direction, they will always find commanders, staff officers, bureaucrats and contractors to plan and implement the most dangerous courses of action.

And that, in a nutshell, is why the US is in a world of trouble — no matter where Admiral Fallon and his ilk of bright, professional servicemen may be posted.