China Redux

This blog frequently looks at the security implications of China’s rise, which are potent and diffuse. But there’s no doubt that the real skirmishes between the US and China are being fought on economic terrain. Friday’s announcement of CVD duties, which are a first step towards greater American protectionism, is one example. The greatest threat for the 21st century is that these economic flare-ups between the US and China will not be contained, but might spill over into the realm of military aggression between these two world powers.

Economic conflict breeds military conflict. The stakes of trade override the ideological power of the Taiwan issue. China’s ability to continue growing at a rapid rate takes precedence, since there can be no sovereignty for China without economic growth. The United States’ role as the world’s superpower is dependent on its ability to lead economically.

As many of you will know from reading this blog, I do not believe that war between the US and China is imminent, or a foregone conclusion in the future. I certainly do not hope for war. But I have little doubt that protectionist policies on both sides greatly increase the likelihood of conflict–far more than increases in military budgets and anti-satellite tests.

With the announcement of this change in trade policy, the Bush Administration has opened the floodgates, and it will be very difficult to turn back the tide. That’s the real concern with this move. Sure, the CVD duties only apply to glossy paper, and things may even stay that way for some time (i.e. wider enforcement by the administration may not follow immediately). But the politics of trade are such that greater protectionism now appears inevitable.

All this points to the fact that Friday’s announcement was merely the opening salvo in a delicate, dangerous dance with China.

A couple years ago I listened to a senior US intelligence analyst talk about the intel community’s views on China. She said that there was a large contingency at the agency that simply assumed that war with China was inevitable at some point. The reason: the sheer number of high-stakes issues meant that not all could be solved by dialogue and cooperation.

I refuse to take such a fatalistic approach. But protectionist trade policies contribute to a rapidly expanding list of incredibly challenging issues, which bodes poorly for the US-China relationship, and for all of us.