China Redux

For the most part, I have stayed away from the issue of Taiwan since I started writing this blog. The main reason for this is that it is hard to write about relations between China and Taiwan without grossly offending a lot of people.

Since I don’t have strong personal beliefs on the subject, I figured it wasn’t worth it. [For the record, I support whatever the people want (a nebulous little phrase). If that means reunification, that's great. If it means another arrangement, that's fine too. At a fundamental level, I think democratic governance is a good thing. As to hammering out the details -- how to get all the diverse interests and views in China and Taiwan together on the same page -- I am happy to cede this work to the politicians in Taipei and Beijing, with help from Washington.]

My primary interest in cross-Strait relations as a policymaker is in maintaining international security and US interests in East Asia. First and foremost, this means avoiding conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

I was fortunate to hear three experts on Asian security policy discuss how Sino-American friction around cross-Strait relations could result in conflict — and how to avoid it — at an event at Washington’s Brookings Institution on April 26. Richard Bush, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, presented their new book, A War Like No Other (available here).

This important new book is based, somewhat contrapuntally, on the authors’ belief that in spite of the disjunctions caused by China’s rise, the US and China can work together to build a strong, mutually beneficial relationship. But there is one issue, more than any other, which threatens to derail the entire bilateral relationship: friction in the Taiwan Strait.

Bush and O’Hanlon offer two key observations in their new book:

• War in the Taiwan Strait is not likely to occur through deliberate choices or premeditations, but because of misconceptions and miscalculations that originate in Taipei and Beijing.
• Any conflict threatens to escalate very quickly, and would have the potential to turn the friendly US-Chinese relationship into a “first-ever shooting war between nuclear powers.”

For these reasons, the authors argue that war must, and can be, prevented. In order to avoid such a disastrous conflict, it is essential that the US work to minimize the risk of miscalculations between Beijing and Taipei. Strengthening communication between Washington and Beijing (in concert with Taipei) can alleviate the immense threats posed by such a conflict.

It is hard to write about this subject without making it sound as if there is an inexorable movement towards conflict. I don’t believe this is the case, and neither do the authors. As Bush and O’Hanlon point out, there are many reasons to feel good about US-Chinese relations. In the era of globalization, countries accumulate power through interdependence, and the US and China both recognize that they need one another. China and Taiwan are heavily invested in one another. Furthermore, in Bush’s view, there is today a rare opportunity for great-power cooperation among the US, China, the European Union, India, Japan, and other leading nations.

Still, even as we seek to effectively minimize the risk from cross-Strait tensions, we must consider how to limit escalation under various conflict scenarios. Bush and O’Hanlon argue that while the probability of a conflict is low, the costs of such a war would be so incredibly high that it is necessary to evaluate threats to escalation — and potential responses — now.

Below, I have compiled a few interesting session points from my notes. Here is a link to the complete transcript from the session. It provides a good starting point for understanding a range of issues affecting cross-Strait relations.

For this conversation, the authors were joined by Michael Green, Japan Chair and Senior Advisor at the Center for Stategic and International Studies, who served as Senior Director for Asian Security Affairs at the National Security Council from 2004-2005.

Causes of conflict in the Taiwan Strait

It is improbable that a conflict would come about through a unilateral decision by either nation. For example, it is unlikely that Taiwan would change its political identity unilaterally, or that China would simply decide to invade Taiwan without significant provocation. Instead, a conflict over Taiwan would most likely be the result of miscalculation and misperception among key actors — namely, China, Taiwan, and the United States. Domestic politics in all three of the countries would play a major role in this.

A nightmare scenario

In the event that China decided to attack Taiwan, it lacks a strong “D-Day,” or amphibious assault, option. But it has other capabilities. For example, China could enforce a “leaky blockade” in which it would threaten to sink any commercial ship seeking to approach Taiwan. Since nearly two-thirds of Taiwanese GDP comes from trade, this could prove devastating. In such a scenario, the US would face a number of difficult choices: would it set up a convoy operation, perhaps using its submarine fleet, to keep shipping lanes open? And if China attacked US or allied vessels, would the US resolve to disarm Chinese ships at port (in China) as a pre-emptive measure?

On reunification

The best outcome, according to the panelists, would be one in which the Taiwanese people are comfortable with the Chinese regime. This would require openness and transparency regarding China’s intentions. Richard Bush argued that the biggest issue for reunification is whether the PLA would insist on stationing personnel on the island; if China asserted its right to do so, this could be a dealbreaker from both a Taiwanese and American perspective. O’Hanlon countered that it would be worth having PLA troops on Taiwan if doing so held the key to solving tensions. Another key strategic issue for reunification is whether the Taiwan Strait would remain an international waterway.

Investing in US-Taiwanese relations

Green argued that the US needs to invest more resources in the US-Taiwanese relationship. In Green’s view, democracy in Taiwan is the “winning wicket,” more so than issue of sovereignty or self-determination (which Taiwanese politicians often emphasize).

Green noted that a strong relationship between Taipei and Washington is actually good for China. However, Chinese policymakers must realize that the US cannot press “mute” on Taiwanese political leaders. Taiwan is a “vibrant democracy,” and China will need to become more comfortable with the fluctuating rhetoric symptomatic of democratic political systems.

Domestic politics in Taiwan will continue to be a primary driver of Chinese-Taiwanese relations. Green argued that China must engage all sides of Taiwan’s political spectrum, instead of aligning with factions sympathetic to its own political interests.